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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The debt of the nation comprises two parts, the external debt and the internal 
debt. After rapidly accumulating arrears of external debt in the post-sanctions period, 
Pakistan has had to seek re-scheduling of her external debt as part of a financing and 
reform package negotiated with the IMF. While re-scheduling has not been sought for 
the first time, the rising burden of this debt has generated a serious debate for the first 
time. In the heat of this debate, the heavier burden of the costlier internal debt has been 
nearly ignored. Although this paper takes account of the totality of the debt towards the 
end, its main focus is on the problem of external debt for reasons not only of its 
immediacy but the prospects of forced self-reliance raised by the financial and 
economic fall-out of the nuclear explosions of May 1998.  
Section II looks for the data sources and discovers that there are as many sizes of 
the debt as there are sources. In its latest report, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) 
characterises the economy as “highly indebted” in terms of its external debt, while the 
latest Economic Survey (ES) does not consider the external debt as large as it appears. 
Section III analyses these claims in terms of the internationally recognised debt burden 
indicators. In Section IV, attention is devoted to debt sustainability criteria. Section V of 
the paper examines the question as to how debt, which also shows access to capital 
required for economic growth, was allowed to become a burden over time. The last 
Section presents main conclusions and suggests an agenda for action. 
 
II. THE THREE SIZES OF EXTERNAL DEBT 
The last ES states: “While infusion of capital has undoubtedly contributed to 
growth and development, it has also led to growing indebtedness in absolute terms. The 
magnitude of the increase is not as large as it appears, if adjustment is made for 
inflation” [Pakistan (1998), p. 97]. In contrast, the SBP warns: “Seen in the context of 
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standard debt ratios, Pakistan has become a highly indebted developing country” [State 
Bank (1998), p. 105]. But the World Bank (WB) publication which is responsible for 
constructing the so-called standard debt ratios, places Pakistan in the category of 
“moderately indebted low income countries” [World Bank (1998), p. 76]. These 
differing interpretations of the debt burden, it must be noted for better or worse, are 
prior to the full reflection of the impact of the economic sanctions. As Table 1 shows, 
the three interpretations have different estimates of absolute burden. 
 
Table 1 
External Debt: Outstanding Stock
* and Servicing 
(Million US Dollars) 
Debt Service/Export Ratio 
(%) 
Years ES  SBP  WB  ES SBP 
1954-55 24  –  –  0.7  – 
1959-60 145  –  –  6.9  – 
1964-65 1,021  – –  25.9  – 
1969-70 2,959  –  3,073  52.1  – 
1977-78 7,189  –  –  24.9  – 
1982-83 9,312  –  –  19.9  – 
1987-88 12,913  –  16,984  25.1 – 
1988-89 14,190  –  18,348  24.1 – 
1989-90 15,094  15,247  20,663  24.9  32.6 
1990-91 15,471  17,295  23,363  21.5  40.3 
1991-92 17,361  19,629  24,918  21.9  42.2 
1992-93 19,044  22,046  24,527  24.2  43.4 
1993-94 20,322  24,482  27,359  25.7  54.5 
1994-95 22,117  25,318  30,248  25.1  55.7 
1995-96 22,275  27,094  29,901  24.5  52.3 
1996-97 23,145  27,863  –  27.2  62.8 
1997-98 22,838  29,715  –  27.7  56.3 
Sources:  Pakistan (1988,  1998, 1998a);  State Bank (1995, 1996, 1997,1998);  World Bank (1996a,1998a).  
 
                   * End of the period. Debt of the Nation  37: 4, 333 
In the ES published by the Finance Division, the data presented do not give a 
complete picture of the total civilian external debt. The data cover only the public and 
publicly guaranteed long- and medium-term concessional debt (i.e. loans with a grant 
element of 25 percent or more) contracted by the Economic Affairs Division with 
official bilateral and multilateral creditors. The absolute burden has not changed much 
in recent years, but over time it grew rather rapidly. From 24 million dollars at the end 
of the Pre-Plan period in 1954-55, it rose sharply to six times at the end of the First Plan 
in 1959-60, seven times over the Second Plan, about three times over the Third Plan 
and about two and a half times by the end of Non-Plan period in 1977–78. The growth 
began to taper off during the subsequent Plans, but was still substantial: 30 percent over 
the Fifth Plan 1978–83, 37 percent over the Sixth Plan 1983–88, 47 percent over the 
Seventh Plan 1988–93. It is only in the Eighth Plan 1993-98 that the burden rose less 
sharply by 20 percent. But the cumulative burden had now become a hefty 22.8 billion 
dollar. And this was not all. The ES concept corresponded to the civilian external debt 
for a long time as debts other than long- and medium-term maturities became significant 
only later. Short-term borrowing had started in the wake of the first oil price shock in 
the early seventies,
1 but its share was not of much consequence till as late as 1989-90. 
Beyond that year, the ES concept cannot but mislead.  
Until 1993-94, the SBP followed the ES concept. Since 1994-95, however, its 
annual reports have devoted an exclusive chapter to the question of debt and improved its 
coverage of external debt by first adding short-term debt contracted by the External 
Finance Wing of the Finance Division and subsequently the IMF, foreign private 
unguaranteed and commercial banks’ credits.
2  In the nineties the difference between the 
two concepts has become too large to be disregarded. To give some idea in absolute 
terms. In 1997-98, the total outstanding debt in terms of the SBP definition was 29.7 
billion dollars, i.e. almost 7 billion dollars higher than the ES definition. The SBP 
definition seems closest to the WB concept of the total debt stock [World Bank (1992), 
p.110)], but not quite. As Table 1 indicates, the amount the SBP defines as the total 
outstanding debt stock at the end of 1997-98 had been surpassed, in the WB reckoning, 
in 1995-96. Like international trade, debt transactions are recorded on two sides and, 
verification should, therefore, not present insurmountable difficulties. As of now, there 
are three estimates of the size of the outstanding external debt, and there could be more. 
 
III.  DEBT BURDEN INDICATORS 
These absolute numbers of outstanding debt stock are scary, but nothing 
meaningful can be said about the burden of debt without any reference to the means to 
1Pakistan (1975). 
2Foreign Currency Accounts (FCAs), constituting around 30 percent of the total debt, are not 
included in the SBP definition of external debt. Nonetheless, the FCAs constituted a short-term liability 
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repay debt. Table 1 also gives debt service/export ratios according to the ES as 
well as the SBP definition. While these ratios seem ominous when compared over 
time or across countries, it is still not possible to draw any useful conclusions 
about the burden of debt. It requires some critical value which the countries must 
move past to enter the danger zone. In the heyday of development economics, as 
also during the “golden age” of growth in the sixties, a debt service/export ratio of 
20 percent was considered “tolerable”. By this yardstick, even the lower ES 
estimates suggest a perpetually intolerable level of debt burden through nearly the 
whole period. 
A single-factoral explanation of the debt burden is no better than any other 
single-factoral theory. With workers’ remittances assuming as much significance as 
exports, if not more, even the denominator required re-defining. Understandably, the 
SBP employs, in addition to debt service/export ratio, the debt service/foreign exchange 
earnings ratio and the outstanding debt/GDP ratio as debt burden indicators. It 
concludes: 
Seen in the context of standard debt ratios, Pakistan has become a 
highly indebted developing country. Pakistan’s ratio of external debt to 
exports of goods and services (including workers’ remittances) at 256.1 
percent during 1997-98 was much higher than 135.8 percent of 
developing countries and 186.7 percent
3 of South Asia, as a group. 
Similarly, debt service ratio at the level of 40.8 percent was also higher 
when compared with 17.0 percent
3 [sic.] of developing countries and 
21.5 percent
3 [sic.] of South Asia. Pakistan’s external debt and debt 
service ratios also exceeded the prescribed debt sustainability normal 
limits of 225-250 percent and 20-25 percent [State Bank (1998), 
p.105]. 
This is a remarkable statement as it does not follow from the information given 
by the SBP and presented in Table 2. It will be seen that Table 2 does not even report 
debt/foreign exchange earnings ratio; and the figure of 256.1 percent has not been 
sourced. We have worked out this ratio by using the SBP data in Table 3 below. It 
reveals that this ratio has never been at this level. Table 2 reports debt service/foreign 
exchange earnings ratio, but not the figure of 40.8 percent either for 1997-98 or as an 
average of three years, which is a standard practice. The source of the critical values for 
the two debt burden indicators, the so-called “prescribed debt sustainability normal 
limits of 225-250 percent and 20-25 percent”, is not revealed either. The categorisation 
of “highly indebted developing country” is nowhere to be found in the literature. 
3“Average of two latest available years, i.e., 1996 and1997.” [Footnote in original]. Debt of the Nation  37: 4, 335 
Table 2 
SBP: External Debt and Service Ratios 
(Percent) 
Years  Outstanding Debt/GDP Ratio 
Debt Service/Foreign Exchange 
Earnings Ratio 
1989-90 38.8  18.8 
1990-91 37.9  24.2 
1991-92 40.3  24.9 
     (39.0)  (22.6) 
1992-93 44.6  27.4 
 (40.9)  (25.5) 
1993-94 47.6  33.4 
 (44.2)  (28.6) 
1994-95 41.7  34.9 
 (44.6)  (31.9) 
1995-96 43.9  33.9 
 (44.4)  (32.1) 
1996-97 46.9  39.3 
 (44.2)  (36.0) 
1997-98 49.5  35.5 
 (46.8)  (36.2) 
Source: State Bank (1995,1996,1997,1998). 
Note: Parentheses show three-year averages.    
 
A short history of the evolution of debt burden indicators will not be out of 
place. The first multi-factoral attempt to estimate the degree of indebtedness was made 
in 1990. Four debt burden indicators were identified for low income countries like 
Pakistan—debt/GNP ratio, debt/foreign exchange earnings ratio, debt service/foreign 
exchange earnings ratio and interest payments/foreign exchange earnings ratio. GNP 
rather than GDP was used because the foreign exchange earnings consisted of export of 
goods and services including workers’ remittances. The degree of indebtedness was 
estimated on the basis of a set of critical values. At the highest level of indebtedness, a 
country was categorised as Severely Indebted Low Income Country (SILIC) if at least 
three of its indicators exceeded the following set of critical values: debt/GNP ratio of 50 
percent; debt/foreign exchange earnings ratio of 275 percent; debt service/foreign 
exchange earnings ratio of 30 percent; and interest payments/foreign exchange ratio of 
20 percent. At the middle level of indebtedness, a country was categorised as Pervez Tahir  37:4, 336 
Moderately Indebted Low Income Country (MILIC) if at least three of the debt 
indicators  stood above 60 percent of their critical values. All others were placed at the 
lowest level of indebtedness as  Less Indebted Low Income Countries (LILICs). [World 
Bank (1990), Appendix III]. 
Using SBP data, we estimate the four debt burden ratios in Table 3 to assess the 
degree of indebtedness of Pakistan. We use actual rather than the next-year’s scheduled 
debt service data as the country met its liabilities fully for the period under report. 
Basing the degree of indebtedness on the single latest year can be distorted. In 
particular, export earnings are prune to serious fluctuations. In World Bank (1992), the 
methodology was changed again to normalise the debt burden indicators by the 




Debt Burden Indicators: SBP Data, WB Methodology 
(Percent) 










1989-90 36.7  178.5  18.8  6.9 
1990-91 37.1  175.9  24.2  7.2 
1991-92 39.8  171.3  24.9  6.7 
 (37.9)  (175.2)  (22.6)  (6.9) 
1992-93 41.6  205.2  27.4  7.6 
 (39.5)  (184.1)  (25.5)  (7.2) 
1993-94 47.0  226.1  33.4  8.2 
 (43.0)  (200.9)  (28.6)  (7.5) 
1994-95 41.7  204.3  34.9  8.2 
 (43.4)  (211.9)  (31.9)  (8.0) 
1995-96 42.1  211.3  33.9  8.5 
 (43.6)  (213.9)  (32.1)  (8.3) 
1996-97 43.8  215.4  39.3  8.1 
 (42.5)  (210.3)  (36.0)  (8.3) 
1997-98 46.7  222.6  35.5  8.3 
 (44.1)  (216.4)  (36.2)  (8.3) 
Source: State Bank (1995,1996,1997,1998). 
Note: Parentheses show three-year averages. 
 
Results contrary to the SBP conclusions emerge from Table 3. Only one 
indicator, i. e., debt service/foreign exchange earnings ratio is above the critical value 
for 1997 as well as the average for 1995–98. On this basis, Pakistan is not a SILIC or 
what the SBP calls a “highly indebted country”. It is rather a MILIC, as three indicators Debt of the Nation  37: 4, 337 
—debt/GNP ratio, debt/foreign exchange earnings ratio and debt service/foreign 
exchange earnings ratio—record values above 60 percent of the critical values for the 
SILIC category, for the last year singly as well as the average for 1995–98. In fact, 
Pakistan has remained a MILIC throughout the period reported in the table, with 
debt/foreign exchange earnings ratio being the problem area.  
The debt picture becomes worse in terms of the World Bank data. This is 
witnessed in Table 4. Take 1993-94: debt/GNP ratio, debt/foreign exchange earnings 
ratio and debt service/foreign exchange earnings ratio were all above the critical values. 
But this was an exceptional year, as debt rose by 11.6 percent following an increase in 
debt flows of 25.6 percent. Debt servicing shot up by 45.3 percent. While the numerator 
grew sharply, the denominator in these cases, i.e., foreign exchange earnings, actually 
suffered a decline. Similarly, as GNP also increased by only about half a percent, the 
denominator grew far less than the numerator so that the debt/GNP ratio recorded its 
worst critical value. But for this unusual year, when Pakistan could be described as a 
SILIC, the average picture portrayed her as MILIC. It seems the average debt burden 
ratios are tending towards a SILIC status towards the end of the period and may well 
corroborate the definite conclusion drawn by the SBP, but the latest available World 
Bank documentation stops at 1995-96. So what is the basis of the SBP conclusion?  
One possibility is that the SBP has prepared its estimation on the basis of the 
latest methodology which has recourse to present valuation. The nominal basis of 
earlier methodology emphasised short term liquidity more than the underlying solvency. 
While the ratios of debt service and interest payments to foreign exchange earnings are 
good indicators of the state of liquidity, debt/GNP and debt/foreign exchange earnings 
ratios do not properly indicate long-term solvency. Static in nature, these ratios fail to 
allow for variation in borrowing terms. They assume similar term structures and interest 
rates. Clearly, different borrowing terms lead to different degrees of indebtedness, even 
if the two debt ratios are the same.  On the other hand, debt service/foreign exchange 
ratio though allows for concessionality, blows out of proportion shorter term structures. 
Thus it gives the impression that a country with smaller graces and maturities will have 
greater debt service difficulties than a country with longer graces and maturities. This is 
not necessarily the case if the country involved has no difficulty in rolling-over.  
A country’s long-term solvency and debt service reality is better captured by the 
present value (PV) of scheduled debt service than the nominal value of debt.
4 The ratio 
of present to the nominal value of the debt measures the degree of concessionality. If 
the present value is higher relative to the nominal value, the degree of concessioality is 
lower. This happens when the interest rate is higher than the discount rate. The World 
Bank adopted the new methodology in 1992-93, the year with which the SBP started its 
holistic debt series. The present value was arrived at by discounting future debt  service- 
4This cannot account for the debt service problems arising from the government budget constraint. 
Not only that there must be an income and an ability to convert it into foreign currency, there must also be the 
ability to tax that income. Further, fiscal stress resulting from free convertibility into foreign currencies and 
internal debt servicing difficulties may impact on the capacity to service external debt without showing up in 
the balance of payments. Pervez Tahir  37:4, 338 
Table 4 
Debt Burden Indicators: WB Data, WB Methodology 
(Percent) 










1969-70 30.6  350.0  24.8  8.8 
1979-80 42.4  208.7  18.3  7.9 
1981-82 38.3  215.0  15.6  7.7 
1984-85 40.4  228.0  24.2  8.5 
1985-86 43.1  228.6  25.4  9.0 
1986-87 47.1  246.2  26.8  9.1 
 (43.5)  (234.3)  (25.5)  (8.9) 
1987-88 (42.3)  231.2  24.7  8.9 
 (44.2)  (235.3)  (25.6)  (9.0) 
1988-89 44.1  241.0  24.2  10.1 
 (45.3)  (239.5)  (25.2)  (9.4) 
1989-90 49.5  250.0  23.3  10.2 
 (45.3)  (240.7)  (24.1)  (9.7) 
1990-91 50.0  249.1  20.9  9.2 
 (47.9)  (246.7)  (22.8)  (9.8) 
1991-92 50.5  254.0  23.8  9.0 
 (50.0)  (251.0)  (22.7)  (9.5) 
1992-93 47.0  246.0  23.9  8.7 
 (49.2)  (249.7)  (22.9)  (9.0) 
1993-94 52.2  276.0  35.0  10.1 
 (50.0)  (258.7)  (27.6)  (9.3) 
1994-95 49.5  252.8  26.6  10.0 
 (49.6)  (258.3)  (28.5)  (9.6) 
1995-96 46.3  250.5  27.4  10.0 
 (49.3)  (259.8)  (29.7)  (10.0) 
Source: World Bank (1992a,1993,1994,1996a,1998a). 
Note: Parentheses show three-year averages. 
 
interest payments and amortisation for 40 years. Four types of discount rates were 
applied. Multilateral credits were discounted by the latest World Bank lending rate, 
bulk of the other credits by the interest rates charged by OECD countries on their 
guaranteed export credits and the rest by the OECD average interest rate. The IMF 
lending was discounted at the SDR lending rate. The calculation is obvious in the case 
of fixed-rate loans, the base rate such as LIBOR is projected as discount rate in the case 
of variable rate loans. Another advantage of this methodology is that discount rates vary 
with the currency composition of debt.  Debt of the Nation  37: 4, 339 
Instead of the four ratios used in the earlier methodology, the indebtedness 
categories are defined on the basis of critical values of two ratios—the ratio of present 
value of debt service to GNP and to foreign exchange earnings. The former is the 
broadest measure of the capacity to repay and the later of the ability to provide the 
required foreign exchange. The respective critical values are 80 percent and 220 
percent. If in a country either of the two ratios has a three-year average above the 
critical value, it is categorised as SILIC. To be a MILIC, one of the two ratios must 
exceed 60 percent of the critical value [World Bank (1992)].  
In effect, a MILIC country would have to average a PV/GNP ratio of above 48 
percent or PV/foreign exchange earnings ratio of above 132 percent. Table 5 presents 
the debt burden ratios estimated on the basis of the new methodology based on present 
valuation. It will be seen that PV/foreign exchange earnings ratio is above 132 percent 
but less than 220 percent, while PV/GNP ratio is less than 48 percent. Until 1995-96, 
Pakistan was thus a MILIC, not a SILIC. Data for subsequent years have not yet been 
published by the World Bank. The presumption that the ratio of 256.1 percent quoted 
by the SBP may be a present value estimate for 1997-98 or a three-year average for 
PV/Foreign Exchange Earnings, is not plausible; it is too out of line with the trend. 
 
Table 5 
Debt Burden Indicators: Present Value Estimates 
(Percent) 




Present Value/ Foreign Exchange 
Earnings Ratio 
1990–93 37  187 
1991–94 39  204 
1993–96 39  206 
Source: World Bank (1992,1993,1994,1996,1998). 
Note: Parentheses show three-year averages. 
 
IV.  DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 
In 1996, the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) was 
launched. Three important considerations determined the development of this initiative. 
First, debt relief provided under existing arrangements (Paris Club, etc) did not 
necessarily lead to eventual exit from debt rescheduling. The reason for the return to 
rescheduling was not always a bad track record of policy performance. Hence the 
second consideration, that debt sustainability per se had to be made an explicit objective 
of policy. This required, as a third consideration, the participation of all creditors, 
including mutilaterals who are traditionally averse to debt rescheduling, so that the costs 
are appropriately apportioned. The overall objective is to remove debt as a constraint on Pervez Tahir  37:4, 340 
growth by reducing it to a sustainable level. 
Numbering 41 and located mostly in Africa, the HIPCs were found to be 
debilitated by an unsustainable burden of debt. In their case, the median ratio of 
present value of debt to foreign exchange earnings was as high as 340 percent. The 
target of sustainability was defined as a range of 200-250 percent for the PV/foreign 
exchange earnings ratio and 20-25 percent for debt service ratio. Actual targets are 
arrived at by carrying out country-specific analysis of debt sustainability. But the 
experience shows that countries in these ranges can hope to meet their current and 
future liabilities without recourse to rescheduling or accumulation of arrears. Debt 
sustainability means a permanent exit from rescheduling. The condition to achieve 
this in the case of private/commercial debt is to ensure that the voluntary debt growth 
never exceeds interest rate. Sustainability of debt from public sources requires 
policies to achieve a healthy balance of payments. [Claessens et al. (1996) and 
Cuddington 1997)]. 
HIPCs are the poorest of the low income countries. Pakistan is a low income 
country, but the available data do not place her the category of HIPCs. The SBP 
modifies the sustainability criteria for HIPCs and calls it prescribed, but without 
saying whose prescription it is. It states: “Pakistan’s external debt and debt service 
ratios also exceeded the prescribed debt sustainability normal limits of 225-250 and 
20-25 percent respectively.” The lower limit of 200 percent for HIPCs has thus been 
raised to 225 percent for the debt ratio while the range of the debt service ratio has 
been kept as it is. As the SBP reports Pakistan’s debt ratio and debt service ratio to 
be 256.1 percent and 40.8 percent in 1997-98, which are above the critical values, the 
country is categorised as “a highly indebted developing country”.  
These debt burden indicators for 1997-98 (the source of which is not clear as 
SBP’s own data throws different estimates in Table 3 above) are then compared by 
the SBP with the average ratios estimated by the World Bank for developing 
countries (135.8 and 17.0 percent) and South Asia (186.7 and 21.5 percent) for 1995-
96 and 1996-97 to conclude that Pakistan fares far worse than these regions. Table 6 
reports the available data on all the analytical classifications of countries and the 
World Bank data on Pakistan to show that such indeed is the case. Pakistan’s 
debt/foreign exchange earnings ratio is lower only than the worst cases of Severely 
Indebted Low Income Countries (SILICs) and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPCs). As already noted, the World Bank classifies Pakistan as a Moderately 
Indebted Low Income Country (MILIC), but its average debt/foreign exchange 
earnings ratio of 251.6 percent is considerably higher than the average of 208.5 for 
MILICs for 1994-95 and 1995-96. Debt of the Nation  37: 4, 341 
The position in the case of debt service/foreign exchange earnings ratio is much 
more alarming. Notwithstanding the very high SBP estimate of 40.8 percent, Table 6 
shows that the average of 27 percent for Pakistan estimated by the World Bank is the 
highest for all types of country classification. It seems the SBP overstates the debt 
service ratio of 40.8 percent, as also the estimates for other years in Table 3 above, by 
including, for some inexplicable reasons, the principal repayments for short-term debt, 
which are normally rolled over. 
 
Table 6 
Comparative Debt Burden Indicators 
(Percent) 
Indicator/Country  





All Developing Countries  –  137.4  134.3  135.8 
Low-income Countries  –  158.7  149.5  154.1 
Severely Indebted Low- 
income Countries (SILICs) 458.1  361.7  –  409.1 
Moderately Indebted Low- 
income Countries (MILICS) 219.8  197.2  –  208.5 
Other Developing Countries  84.7  79.2  –  81.9 
Heavily Indebted Poor    
Countries (HIPCS)  455.6  424.4  –  440.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa  –  221.6  201.7  211.6 
South Asia  –  193.6  179.8  186.7 
Pakistan 252.8  250.5  –  251.6 
Debt Service/Foreign 
  Exchange Earnings Ratio 
All Developing Countries  –  17.2  16.7  16.9 
Low Income Countries  –  13.3  12.9  13.1 
Severely Indebted Low- 
income Countries (SILICs) 19.9  15.3  –  17.6 
Moderately Indebted Low- 
income Countries (MILICs) 25.5  22.9  –  24.2 
Other Developing Countries  8.8  8.0  –  8.4 
Heavily Indebted Poor   
Countries (HIPCs)  26.6  27.4  –  27.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa  30.1  22.3  –  26.2 Pervez Tahir  37:4, 342 
South Asia  –  14.2  11.5  12.8 
Pakistan –  22.0  21.0  21.5 
Source: World Bank (1998, 1998a). 
V.  THE ACCUMULATION OF BURDEN 
Access to external finance is useful, and concessional finance much more so. In 
theory, it adds to domestic saving and by softening the foreign exchange constraint on 
imported capital goods and inputs, permits a higher rate of investment. This higher rate 
of investment, as the story goes, leads to a higher rate of growth, a higher rate of 
domestic saving and a higher export growth to convert saving into foreign exchange 
required to service debts. Although foreign aid to Pakistan had started in 1950 and 
agreements were signed in all its forms within two years,
5 it was however during its 
Second Five Year Plan 1960–65 that she became a widely quoted model of effective 
borrowing for development. The rate of investment rose sharply from 11.8 percent to 
18.3 percent, with one-third of the total and one-half of the public sector investment 
financed by external resources. The result was an impressive rate of growth, a jump in 
the rate of domestic saving from 8.8 percent to 11.7 percent and an export growth of 7 
percent per annum compared to the target of 3 percent. The Plan ended with a 
manageable debt service ratio of 9.9 percent. 
Not only that everything was according to the script, it was much better. Just 
when the planners were confidently preparing the Third Plan 1965–70 for a “take-off 
into self-sustained growth”, something beyond the pale of economics happened to derail 
the economy for decades to come. Perfectly timed for the launch of the Third Plan on 
July 1, 1965 the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium met in May and judged Pakistan’s request 
for some 500 million dollars for the first year fit to be recommended to the pledging 
session, which would be held on July 21, 1965. It was postponed to September 21 at 
the behest of the United States which had provided half of the funding for the Second 
Plan, one-fourth of it in grants and the balance largely as concessional credits. 
Contrary to common perception, the immediate reason was not the war with India 
which broke out later in September of the same year, but Pakistan’s contacts with the 
leaders of the Non-Aligned movement. It was not understood as well at that time as it 
is now and, in any case, not stated as clearly as now that development aid flows in a 
political framework.
6 As a matter of fact, the pledging session was not held before 
November 1966. 
A reduction of 27 percent in external resources during the Third Plan checked 
the momentum of investment generated by the Second Plan. The rate of investment fell 
from 18.3 percent achieved in the terminal year of the Second Plan to 14.3 percent by 
the end of the Third Plan in 1969-70. Domestic saving rate declined from 11.7 percent 
5Foreign aid started with the Colombo Plan in 1950 in the form of grants. The first technical 
assistance agreement was signed with the United States on February 2, 1951, the first project loan with the 
World Bank on March 27, 1952 and the first commodity loan with the US-EXIM on September 17, 1952. 
[Pakistan (1969)] 
6For instance, an important reason cited for falling net concessional assistance is “the declining 
strategic and military importance of development aid since the end of the cold war” [World Bank (1998), 
p.49]. Debt of the Nation  37: 4, 343 
to 10.7 percent. With uncertain aid horizon, five-year investment planning effectively 
came to an end, giving way to the more operational annual plans and medium-term 
sectoral programmes such as the wheat self-sufficiency programme. With continuing 
clouds over the aid horizon, and ever hardening terms, even the pretence of five year 
plans was given up after the Third Plan.  
The fiscal straitjacket of rising debt service and defence expenditure originated in 
the Third Plan period. Between 1959-60 and 1967-68, 35 percent of investment and 48 
percent of total imports were financed by foreign assistance. The economy had become 
“increasingly aid-addicted” and the rate of economic growth “fluctuated with the inflow 
of aid, reducing the domestic effort to a residual claimant” [Tahir (1970, 1974]. Within 
a decade the debt burden had entered the danger zone, despite high economic growth. 
Table 7 traces the movement of the debt service ratio. It will be seen that the increase in 
debt servicing overwhelmed the increase in foreign exchange earnings, leading to an 
ever increasing share of foreign exchange earnings consumed by debt servicing. 
 
Table 7 
External Debt Burden in the Growing Sixties 
(Percent) 
Years 
Increase in Debt 
Servicing 
Increase in Foreign 
Exchange Earnings  Debt Service Ratio 
1960-61 –  –  3.6 
1961-62 78.5  4.6  6.2 
1962-63 55.1  16.0  8.2 
1963-64 29.5  –0.1  10.7 
1964-65 1.2  9.2  9.9 
1965-66 18.4  9.1  10.7 
1966-67 29.9  6.0  13.1 
1967-68 13.3  10.0  13.5 
1968-69 42.3  10.2  17.5 
1969-70 13.8  2.1  19.5 
1970-71 23.4  –4.5  25.3 
1971-72 15.9  –3.0  30.1 
Source: Pakistan (1971, 1972). 
 
A debate on the socio-political and economic costs of debt had begun in the 
sixties. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, a former prime minister, censured the military regime 
of Ayub Khan for mortgaging the future of the country. At the academic level, Power 
(1963) observed: “It is fair to say that in Pakistan the mobilisation of domestic resources Pervez Tahir  37:4, 344 
has never had first priority.” Griffin (1965) showed that the stagnating wheat 
output was associated with imports from the United States under PL-480. Edible 
oils output met with similar fate. The government response was three-fold. First, 
availability of foreign assistance was an indication of the world confidence in the 
economy of Pakistan. Secondly, aid was being utilised effectively, as indicated by 
a high rate of growth. Third, the debt liability arising from aid inflow was not 
beyond the capacity to repay. It was estimated that every 100 dollars received in 
aid added 33 dollars to income, a significant part in the form of exports to enable 
debt servicing [Pakistan (1968, 1969)]. The Perspective Plan 1965–85 announced 
with the Third Plan included elimination of dependence on aid among its 
objectives. In 1968, the objectives announced for the Fourth Plan 1970–75 talked 
of increasing self-reliance. [Pakistan (1965, 1968a)] The realisation of these 
objectives was envisaged as declining requirements of aid for investment and 
ignored the debt burden implications [Rahman (1967)].
7 
In effect, perspective and five-year planning had become only academic 
exercises since 1968-69, when annual plans became the cutting edge of planning 
to adjust to uncertainties of aid. The planners learned, to their cost, that doing well 
and effective utilisation were not the only criteria for uninterrupted aid flows. 
While aid continued to be the starting point for planning future investment, annual 
plans came handy whenever aid disruption forced revisions. In the later event, 
investment invariably fell. The country took a long time to recover to the 
investment rate achieved at the end of the Second Plan and the years of slid-back 
far outnumber the years when it was surpassed. The efforts to pick up the slack 
caused by aid shortfalls were weak, with costlier internal debt substituting for the 
external debt more often than a broad-based approach to mobilising public 
revenues and saving. The only attempt made to reduce somewhat the vulnerability 
associated with aid was to diversify the sources of aid. Thus in the first two years 
of the Third Plan, the share of non-Consortium sources in total aid rose to 33 
percent from only 3 percent in the Second Plan period. 
A number of factors were responsible for the rising debt service ratio. As 
the outstanding debt rose with the increasing translation of commitments into 
disbursements, interest payments went up. With the expiry of grace periods, 
repayments fell due. Most important, at a time when net transfers on debt began to 
decline, grants shrank in tandem. From being a multiple of the debt flow in the 
Pre-Second Plan period, the grants started to trail behind the debt flows since the 
middle of the Second Plan to eventually become a trickle towards the end of the 
Third Plan. The percent share of net transfers in the debt flow came down from the 
range of eighties in the period up to the Second Plan to the seventies and the 
sixties in the Third Plan. Table 8 illustrates these changes. 
7See also Naqvi (1971). Debt of the Nation  37: 4, 345 
Table 8 
Net Transfer of Resources in the Sixties 
(Million US$) 
 
Disbursement on Long- and Medium- 
term Debt (Million US $) 




Pre-Second Plan (1951–60)  192  160 650  810 
   (83.3) 
1960-61 111  94  231  325 
   (84.7) 
1961-62 138  107  166  273 
   (77.5) 
1962-63 258  211  243  454 
   (81.8) 
1963-64 315  253  226  479 
   (80.3) 
1964-65 410  348  296  644 
   (84.9) 
Second Plan (1960–65)  1232 973  1162  2135 
   (79.0) 
1965-66 392  318  141  459 
   (81.1) 
1966-67 432  336  191  527 
   (77.8) 
1967-68 506  398  223  621 
   (78.7) 
1968-69 493  335  101  436 
   (68.0) 
1969-70 501  325  63  388 
   (64.9) 
Third Plan (1965–70)  2324 1712  719  2431 
   (73.7) 
Source: Pakistan (1998b). 
Note: Parentheses represent net transfer on debt as a percentage of debt flow. 
 
A mid-plan development of note in the Third Plan period was the fact, visible in 
Table 8, that total transfers fell below the debt flow to start a trend that in time would 
become irreversible.  Not only the grants became a smaller proportion of the gross flow, 
average interest rate also rose significantly from 2.6 to 3.9 percent. In May 1968, the 
Ayub Government formally lodged a request for debt relief, not with the Paris Club, but 
the Paris-based Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium [Tahir (1998)]. The confidence exedud 
earlier about the impact of aid was now on the wane. In less than a year, the government Pervez Tahir  37:4, 346 
fell and with it the edifice of foreign-assisted growth. Pakistan found strength in its case 
in the Pearson Commission Report, which towards the end of the sixties emphasised 
debt relief as a legitimate form of aid. The Consortium met in February 1970 to 
consider a report prepared by the World Bank. But no decision was taken. Meanwhile, 
the Bangladesh crisis disrupted exports and the debt service ratio shot up to 25.3 percent 
in 1970-71 and to over 30 percent in 1971-72. Conversions of debt service falling due 
between May 1 to October 31, 1971 on selected bilateral loans under the aeiges of the 
Consortium were suspended. The suspension continued till an interim agreement was 
finalised in May 1972, after the break-up of the country. 
While the debt crisis of the sixties resulted from the political and strategic 
developments of 1965 leading to the compositional shift away from grants, the non-Plan 
period of the seventies witnessed an attempt to force up the rate of investment through 
accelerated debt financing, internal and external, of lumpy capital-intensive projects. 
There were shifts from bilateral to multilateral debt, from non-project to slow-
disbursing project assistance and the beginning of short-term commercial debt and 
medium-term borrowing from Islamic countries. The impact on debt servicing though 
restrained by the various debt relief arrangements secured by the country,
8 was a 240 
percent increase in seven years.  
Another military government had taken over when debt relief arrangements 
expired in June 1978, with net transfers dipping to less than 50 percent of the gross 
disbursement. The political climate changed again in the wake of the Afghan crisis. 
Debt relief was made available yet again in 1981-82 for 18 months, but it could not stop 
the net transfers from falling to as low as 13 percent in 1983-84. The return of the 
United States with a package of 3.2 billion dollars for 1982-87 and the Consortium 
assistance for Afghan refugees improved the proportion of grants and thus the net 
transfer. The percentage of grants in disbursements improved from 11 percent in the 
non-Plan period to an average of 28 percent while the US assistance lasted. The first 
package was followed by another six-year package of 4.02 billion dollars in 1988–93, 
only to be abandoned in 1990 after the loss of the U.S. interest in Afghanistan, an 
inevitable outcome of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the end of the cold war. 
Debt service ratio thus remained within manageable limits during the presence of the 
USAID. A debt forgiveness would perhaps have significantly reduced the possibility of 
a future debt crisis. 
An important fact to note about this period of generous aid is that internal debt 
burden surpassed the external debt. From the point of view of vulnerability and external 
dependence, internal debt need not be as worrisome as external debt. It does not lead to 
transfer of wealth abroad; the nation owes it to itself. It may cause inflation and 
redistribute wealth from the poor to the rich [Tahir (1996)], not a very laudable effect, 
but still a supposedly manageable internal problem. However, it has led to a substitution 
of loan finance for tax finance, which adversely influences growth as well as solvency. 
8See Pakistan (1983a) for a note on various reschedulings. Debt of the Nation  37: 4, 347 
The large bulk of aid was project aid, which was mostly utilised on undertakings with a 
reasonable expectation of returns. About half of the aid was committed to agriculture, 
water and power, which are sectors with high economic returns. It is the lax tax effort 
that is perpetuating a fiscal deficit and a habituation of borrowing. In fact the increasing 
role of short term borrowing has been encouraged by costlier domestic financing. Short 
term external borrowing has exceeded the long term borrowing. 
Table 9 shows the process that has led to the present debt crisis. It uses the 
available World Bank data to illustrate the point, rather than the latest SBP and ES data 
to protect definitional and conceptual consistency. It shows an erratic picture of the flow 
of long and medium term debt since 1988-89, the first year of the Seventh Plan. 
However, due to rising debt service, the net transfers on this debt have become very 
small. In fact the position of Table 8 above has been reversed. In the sixties, grants in 








Long- and Medium- 
term Debt 
Net Transfer on 
Long- and Medium- 
term Debt 
Net Transfer on 
Short-term 
Debt Grants  Total 
Seventh Plan 1988–93  12586 3165  –1509  1695  3351 
   (25.1) 
1988-89 2373  789  84  381  1254 
1989-90 1766  104  150  324  578 
   (5.9) 
1990-91 2308  582  714  479  1775 
   (25.2) 
1991-92 2923  781  71  310  1162 
   (26.7) 
1992-93 3216  909  –2528  201  –1418 
   (28.3) 
Eighth Plan 1993–96  10946  1563  332  588  2483 
   (14.3) 
1993-94 4039  681  –118  199  762 
   (16.9) 
1994-95 3292  318  1094  188  1600 
   (9.7) 
1995-96 3615  564  –644  201  121 
   (15.6) Pervez Tahir  37:4, 348 
Source: World Bank (1998). 
Note: Parentheses represent net transfer on debt as a percentage of debt flow. 
on debt and thus enabled debt service payments. Now debt service of the less expensive 
long and medium term debt has to be arranged by net transfer on the relatively more 
expensive short term debt. Borrowing short to service past borrowing is the classical 
debt trap, as ensuring net transfers on short term debt leads the economy into a liquidity 
crisis, which eventually tells on credit ratings as the market develops serious doubts 
about the fundamentals and ultimate solvency of the economy. In the event 
rescheduling becomes inescapable although the world system lets this happen only 
when it perceives a minimal presence of moral hazard.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 
Before we can even begin to address a problem, there must be access to 
reliable and useable information. The first, and the most obvious, conclusion of 
the paper relates to data, which present more than one estimates of the external 
debt. Information is also lacking on features which have assumed considerable 
significance in recent years. Currency composition, variable interest borrowing, 
short term debt, unguranteed debt are some examples. Secondly, debt is not, nor 
it has been, an explicit concern of policy or planning. Governments in Pakistan 
have responded to the debt situation only in times of political emergencies and 
arranged fire fighting for what is invariably perceived as a liquidity crisis. Hence 
the search for remedies within the confines of aid-debt matrix. Ensuring a net 
inflow until the next “liquidity crisis” with negative transfers belongs to this 
genre.
9 The original budget for 1998-99 illustrates the point. It required a net 
inflow of only Rs 14.7 billion. But for the nuclear explosions, this would have 
been available and there would be no crisis. That this would entail a gross inflow 
of Rs 142 billion, more than half of it short-term, was not a matter for the 
moment. Thirdly, and consequently, the existing institutional structure dealing 
with questions of debt came to be designed without an architect. Fourthly, the 
debt questions, even when there is limited convertibility, require a holistic 
approach. The financing of fiscal deficit would still need Rs 128.5 billion of 
internal debt. If the issue of external vulnerability is a solvency issue, then the 
separability of two kinds of debt is of no help. Finally, this paper is not arguing 
against contracting debt, external or internal. Access to capital is important. All 
that is being said is that the nation must think up some safe limits—in the interest 
of protecting national priorities. 
The following agenda for action is proposed, not as an exhaustive set, but a basis 
for debate. 
9A pioneer in development had pointed out a long time ago that the world capitalist system is, in the 
ultimate analysis, only interested in keeping the borrower current on interest payments. See Rosenstein-Rodan 
(1944); also Tahir (1997). Keynes had argued that the way to deal with debtor countries was not to squeeze 
“reparations” but to start “Marshall Plans”. Debt of the Nation  37: 4, 349 
  One:  A central agency must collect, collate and project debt information. It should 
be professionally staffed by market analysts on currencies, debt and capital, 
lawyers and financial economists. 
  Two: The debt agency should furnish an informed basis for decisions on all debts 
by an inter-agency committee drawn from concerned Divisions/SBP. 
  Three: Decisions of the inter-agency committee should be made within the 
framework of a statuary limitation on debt. 
  Four:  Privatisation should exclusively focus on debt for equity swaps . 
  Five: Some other swaps should also be explored. For instance, debt for poverty 
alleviation, debt for social action, debt for good governance. 
  Six: All aid negotiations, it must be understood, are in effect debt negotiations. 
Debt reduction should be an explicit objective and debt management policy 
an important part of economic management so as to access foreign capital 
without jeopardising the budget and the balance of payments. 
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The paper presented by Pervez Tahir is a useful contribution to the 
understanding of debt problem in Pakistan. In particular, the paper provides a great 
deal of information on the current state of the debt problem that is not readily 
available from the published data sources. Some of the important points that the 
author has made are highlighted below. 
The study provides an excellent historic background to the way debt has 
accumulated in Pakistan since 1950s and pinpoints economic and political events 
associated with various turning points in the history of debt accumulation in 
Pakistan. The paper presents an objective analysis of the problem with no particular 
bias. For example, while it is mentioned that various data sources provide quite 
different statistics, the paper does not recommend in favour of any particular data 
source. The paper follows a positivistic approach to the problem and does not 
criticise any particular data source. 
The second point that the study makes is that debt reduction has never been a 
serious objective of economic planning and policy. Rather debt has been used as an 
instrument for achieving other targets. This strategy is obviously not the most 
appropriate one and the policy-makers can no longer afford to by-pass the core issue 
of sustainability in designing economic policies. 
An important message of the study is that non-availability of consistent and 
reliable data is a major problem, not only for the policy-makers, but also for those 
who find the subject worth analysing. As is well known, the problem of data 
inconsistency is not confined to debt statistics. Neither does it arise just because 
there are more than one data sources. Apart from differences between Economic 
Survey (Finance Division) and Annual Report (State Bank of Pakistan), for example, 
there are at least apparent inconsistencies within one document as well. This is 
especially true if one tries to analyse debt problem by relating current account gap 
with the domestic resource gaps in the public and private sectors. Although most of 
the difficulties result from differences in definitions, the explanatory notes do not 
guide sufficiently. For example it is almost impossible to reconcile statistics in 
sections on national income accounts, balance of payments and public finance of 
Economic Survey with one another.  
The author recommends setting-up a central agency to collect and compile 
debt statistics. However, this recommendation runs contrary to the conclusion of the 
study that data inconsistency is a major problem in analysing debt problem. One of 
the main reasons for data inconsistency is that there are more than one departments 
that compile data. The State Bank of Pakistan and Economic Advisor’s Wing that Comments  37:4, 353
publish  Annual Report and Economics Survey, respectively are after all central 
agencies and having another one is likely to add to the confusion. What is needed is a 
clear description of how data are complied and the dissemination of information 
necessary to reconcile the so-called statistical discrepancies. 
There is not much to criticise in the paper. It is very clearly written and 
follows a set objective. However the study is confined to descriptive analysis and 
does not include any economic modelling exercise that would have added value to 
the research. 
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